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With the database as evidence, it was possible to show 
the following:
•	 In almost all cases, deminers did not lie down to 
excavate: they knelt or squatted. 
•	 Anti-personnel blast mines were the most com-
mon device involved in accidents.
•	 Severe eye and hand/arm injuries were more 
common than severe leg injuries.
•	 Heavy PPE was rarely worn correctly.
•	 No commonly used PPE could provide appropri-
ate protection against the close-quarter detona-
tion of a fragmentation device.
•	 There was no reason to believe that a ballistic hel-
met or armor back-panel were necessary during 
demining tasks.
•	 High-tech blast boots were of no proven advan-
tage and could give false confidence, while com-
mon footwear (not specially designed to prevent 
injuries) was equally effective/ineffective when 
stepping on the smallest mines.
•	 Safer working procedures were more likely to pre-
vent severe injury than the use of more PPE. 
•	 Traumatic injury was increasingly rare and could 
usually be stabilized in the field by appropriately 
trained and equipped paramedics.
•	 Shortcomings in management, leadership and 
training could be identified as a primary or con-
tributory cause in many accidents. 
Not all of these findings were universally accepted, 
but the evidence meant that they could not be ignored 
and a process of compromise within the IMAS Board 
membership could begin with the aim of achieving a 
pragmatic and practical consensus.
Post-2001 IMAS Updates 
The Database has provided evidence in support of sev-
eral updates to the 2001 IMAS. These updates were all 
related to field safety in one way or another. Below are 
several of the updates:
•	 The distinction between “working-distances” and 
“safety-distances” in IMAS 10.20 was support-
ed by accident data analysis that showed that the 
minimum safety distances imposed for an AP 
blast-mine risk were frequently ignored and that 
secondary injuries only occurred when a second 
person was very close to the detonation. The re-
quired IMAS distance was actually a “safe dis-
tance” for a deliberate detonation (with a large 
safety margin) but was often impractical and 
unnecessary during field operations. A distinc-
tion between working-distances (when no delib-
erate detonations will occur) and safety distances 
(when deliberate detonations will be made) was 
introduced. This allowed more people to work si-
multaneously in many areas, thereby increasing ef-
ficiency. It may also have increased field safety by 
making supervision easier.
•	 The database was used to support the contention 
that the largest ERW in a minefield should not 
be presumed to be the greatest threat when de-
termining working distances. It was decided that 
the greatest threat should be the largest device 
that could be detonated when using the prede-
termined procedures and tools. This meant that 
in mixed AP and anti-tank minefields, manual 
working distances could often be based on the AP 
threat. Evidence that visors were habitually not 
worn, or were worn incorrectly, led to the redraft-
ing of IMAS 10.30 to allow other eye protection as 
a minimum. Five-millimeter polycarbonate gog-
gles became the minimum requirement (subject 
to a risk assessment), although full-face visors re-
mained the preferred option. 
•	 The final wording of the new Land Release IMAS 
The Database of Demining Accidents contains the original demining ac-
cident reports overlaid with a summary and easy-search facility. Always 
available on request, the database records were put online at ht tp: //dda-
sonline.com in 2006. This site receives an average of 400 discrete visits a 
day, with the most popular topic being “Deminer training” (ht tp: //ddason-
line.com/suggested_training_usesDDAS.htm).
This article evaluates the need for a centralized accident-report database within the field of 
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several recommendations on how to further reduce severe injury within the industry. 
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The Database of Demining Accidents:  
    A Driving Force in HMA
The Database of Demining Accidents (DDAS)was started in 1998 using public data gathered for the United States Army Communications-
Electronics Command, Night Vision & Electronic Sen-
sors Directorate. The database is an easy-to-use system 
containing the original demining accident reports with 
corresponding summaries.
DDAS Influence on Humanitarian Mine Action
Having a collection of field reports about demining 
accidents and the context surrounding them has influ-
enced the evolution of the International Mine Action 
Standards. Basing IMAS content on empirical evidence 
rather than received wisdom has enhanced United Na-
tions Mine Action Service’s field authority and contrib-
uted to its success.
During the drafting of IMAS 2001, the DDAS proved 
invaluable in settling disputes about basic demining 
safety considerations. In the absence of other data, the 
previous U.N. standards (1997) had been dominated by 
caution and were not well received in the field. With the 
database as evidence, the following was established:
•	 The activities conducted when accidents occurred
•	 The explosive remnants of war most commonly 
involved in accidents
•	 The areas of the body most in need of protection
•	 The effectiveness of protection used
•	 The working methods most common around 
the world
•	 The limitations of commonly used metal-detectors
•	 The shortcomings of some mine-detection dog 
procedures and processes
•	 The minimum level of medical provision needed
•	 That mechanical demining was not the panacea 
it was claimed to be
At the time, received wisdom was that deminers lie 
down to excavate, should wear personal protective equip-
ment with ballistic helmets and back-panels, and that 
the most common demining accident was stepping on a 
mine. Deminers’ protective visors had to be 13-millime-
ters thick, and casualty evacuation by helicopter was re-
quired at all sites.
During a rest break in Mozambique photographs are used 
to explain how devices function.  
All photos and graphics courtesy of the author.
Figure 1: Analysis of the DDAS can highlight fail-
ings in equipment or training. Between 2005-10 
58 percent of missing mine accidents were missed while 
using a metal-detector.
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accidents. UNMAS has supplied a few accident records, 
but no one has conducted a comprehensive data-gather-
ing exercise, thus leaving the DDAS as the only record of 
accidents in the industry. The value of a good accident ar-
chive is recognized in all hazardous professions except, it 
seems, mine action.
The current number of recorded victims in the DDAS 
is close to 1,000. This includes all the records for some 
countries in some periods, which has allowed an assess-
ment of the data-spread to conclude that the records are 
broadly representative of all injurious humanitarian-de-
mining accidents.
Despite the current IMAS requirement for demining 
groups to share accident data, many do not. Accident se-
crecy has been a constant problem, arising sometimes 
out of loyalty to colleagues and sometimes because the 
investigators want to protect the victim’s insurance pay-
out. It is hard to criticize demining groups when the 
United Nations Development Programme, United Na-
tions Office of Project Services and UNMAS are also re-
luctant to share any possibly embarrassing data. Because 
the names of the victims, investigators or demining 
groups are not published, however, there is no real rea-
son to fear sharing accident details and the lessons that 
can be learned from them.
The database has been in the public domain for 12 
years, and the media or competing demining organiza-
tions have not abused it, implying that the removal of 
names and identifiers before publication has been suc-
cessful in preventing abuse.
Future Uses
The weight of evidence within the database changes as 
new records are added. Currently, database evidence could 
be used to improve the safety of deminers in several ways: 
•	 The use of purpose-designed blast-resistant hand 
tools can save fingers and hands. This has been 
known for more than a decade but overlooked 
by managers, conscious of insufficient resources, 
who instead provide cheaper alternatives such as 
gardening tools that put the user’s hand on top 
of the blast, then shower the deminer with frag-
ments as the tool breaks up. Compelling evidence 
exists for the use of purpose-designed, blast-re-
sistant hand tools to be made a requirement (in-
stead of a recommendation) in IMAS 10.30.
•	 Using a pickaxe has been common in some coun-
tries for at least 15 years. Clearing mines with a 
pickaxe sounds bizarre, but when starting an ex-
cavation in compacted or rocky ground, other 
tools can be ineffective and frustratingly slow. 
Banning the use of the pickaxe has been tried—
and widely ignored. Engineers at MIT have de-
signed an alternative tool that can do the same 
job as a pickaxe with reduced risk. The tool is far 
easier to guide the tip to the intended spot, re-
quires less energy to use and reduces risk if deto-
nation occurs. A field trial of this MIT device in 
Sri Lanka during 2006 was a success. Most peo-
ple, however, have never heard of this tool, and 
it has not been widely used. The existence of a 
pickaxe alternative, designed to stay intact and 
protect the user’s hands, should be publicized 
along with examples of accidents in which pick-
axes were used.
•	 Manual deminers using metal detectors provide an 
archetypal image of the working deminer. While 
some deminers are skilled with metal detectors, evi-
dence indicates that many deminers and their train-
ers do not understand the limitations of these tools, 
and they do not know how to use metal detectors 
with confidence and competence. For example, ac-
cidents have occurred when a detector is wrongly 
adjusted and is unable to detect the targets. Inad-
equate detector training has also led to inaccurate 
pinpointing and excavations starting on top of the 
mine. The accident record contains abundant evi-
dence supporting the need to improve metal-detec-
tor training at all mine-action levels. 
08.20, 08.21 and 08.22 were also informed by a 
close knowledge of the accident record.1
•	 The EOD-accident record informed the IMAS 
09.30 Explosive Ordnance Disposal revisions.
•	 The IMAS Technical Notes 10.20-02/09 for Mine 
Action on Field Risk Assessment depends heav-
ily on an intimate knowledge of the accident re-
cord and the factors that commonly contribute 
to accidents.2
•	 A significant number of accident reports include 
elements that show the investigators did not know 
(or had misunderstood) the IMAS requirements. 
This has supported arguments for simplifying the 
language and presentation of IMAS documents.
Research
The authority of the database as an objective record 
has been widely accepted. Evidence from the database is 
frequently cited in academic papers (Post-Conflict Re-
construction Master of Arts at York, U.K., and doctorate 
research at University of Genova, Italy, for example). The 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology runs doctorate 
research requiring students to study accidents from the 
database,3 and other universities have asked for permis-
sion to link to the DDAS site. The Council for Scientific 
and Industrial Research, a government research institute 
in South Africa, has based several projects on the results 
of studying the DDAS. Between 2001 and 2010, technical 
inquiries to Noel Mulliner at UNMAS were frequently 
answered with reference to DDAS accident records. 
The database cannot be used to prove much statisti-
cally because it does not include all accident records and 
relies on the honesty and sometimes questionable objec-
tivity of the original accident investigators. However, the 
database allows qualitative assessments backed by quan-
titative analysis, together providing compelling evidence 
of general conclusions that outweigh any individual’s 
personal opinion. For an explanation of the quantitative 
and qualitative data analysis, see http://ddasonline.com/
observeinferDDAS.htm. 
Lessons Learned
In 2008, the author’s DDAS analysis showed the 
following:
•	 Failings in management and supervision have in-
creased over time.
•	 There has been an increase of expatriate field su-
pervisors who had limited knowledge or appropri-
ate experience regarding humanitarian demining. 
Some suffered accidents; others were a direct cause 
of them.4
•	 Many expatriates routinely applied double-stan-
dards and did not comply with their own rules: 
Their leadership abilities were put in question.5
•	 Severe hand/arm injuries became more common than 
severe eye injuries, albeit by a very small margin.
•	 Low-cost PPE6 was as effective as expensive PPE 
and often easier to use. Body protection (aprons) 
with a NATO STANAG V50 of 380 m/s was involved 
in more than 30 accidents and always provided ef-
fective protection, even when faced with boosted AP 
blast mines.
•	 Visors used in the field more than five years shattered 
in several accidents, implying that sun-hardening was 
a problem (this led to UNMAS Technical Note 10.10 / 
02 for Mine Action addressing the subject).7
•	 Wearing a full-face visor did not reduce the inci-
dence of severe eye injury.
•	 The need for dedicated on-site, ambulance vehicles 
was reinforced when an accident occurred in which 
the only vehicle, plus the only radio, were destroyed 
in an accident at a remote minefield. Several fatali-
ties resulted.
•	 Common training needs of deminers and medical 
staff were identified.
Some of these conclusions were difficult for IMAS 
Board Members or field practitioners to accept, but un-
expectedly, more accident data was informally supplied 
than at any time before.
Data Gathering and Security
Responsible field staff provide accident records be-
cause they understand that sharing this information 
might prevent the unnecessary repetition of avoidable 
The folding Minelab detector, an ergonomic success.
Figure 2. Blast resistant long-handled tools have been prov-
en to reduce the risk of severe hand injury.
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the detailed reports that provide the core of the DDAS. 
Without the original accident report to which to refer, 
analysis will rely on a brief summary made by an of-
fice-based staff member. This initiative may succeed, 
but the result will be “shallow” because it will depend 
entirely on the many levels of interpretation between 
the accident event and the “tick” placed in an available 
box on a form.
In the meantime, the DDAS is currently being up-
dated. Demining accident records, questions and com-
ments should be sent to the author at avs@nolandmines.
com. 
See endnotes page 81
The originator and keeper of the Database of Demin-
ing Accidents, which is online at http://ddasonline.com, 
wrote this article.
The longest serving member of the IMAS board, 
Andy Smith has worked in humanitarian mine ac-
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clearance, surveying, nongovernmental organization 
management and United Nations Development Pro-
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oping safety equipment for use in HMA. Examples 
include the most commonly used blast visor and blast-
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working for the U.S. government, U.N. agencies, 
NGOs, universities, private companies and the Ge-
neva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.
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Conveying Lebanon’s Cluster Bomb Issue through Film
Death in the Fields is an animated documentary that focuses on the cluster bomb crisis in southern Lebanon. The millions of unexploded bomblets scattered across the country’s south are the ill-fated result of a 2006 Israe-
li offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Today, in addition to killing 
and maiming indiscriminately, these weapons continue to contaminate 
lands where children once played and make agricultural land unavail-
able to farmers.
Throughout the film’s concise run time of just over 11 minutes, edito-
rial cartoonist Patrick Chapette manages to convey the dread of these 
horrific weapons in a unique fashion. His black-and-white illustrations 
are surprisingly lively while alluding to the starkness of the issue. When these illustrations mix with real-life pho-
tographs, statistics and stories, they pack a serious punch. The film premiered at the Visions du Réel film festival in 
Nyon, Switzerland on 8 April 2011 and is currently available on the International Committee for the Red Cross’s web-
site: http://bit.ly/j6pjIo. 
~Dan Baker, CISR Staff
•	 Among the records, frequent evidence shows that 
the appointment of international staff with inad-
equate knowledge of the IMAS or demining (de-
spite high-level academic or military qualifications) 
can lead to increased risk for working deminers. In 
the field, experience and a commitment to learning 
from others are more valuable qualifications than 
academic or military achievement. This could be 
stressed in the IMAS and put into practice by the 
U.N. agencies and various demining organizations.
•	 From the earliest records to the present day, there 
are examples of new commercial organizations hav-
ing accidents that repeat the obvious errors of pre-
vious accidents (recently, this has been especially 
obvious in Afghanistan). This implies that contract 
conditions need revising so that the deminer’s safe-
ty shares the same priority as cost and which require 
a knowledge of the history of demining (including 
any accidents) where the contract is awarded.
•	 The insurance provision for local deminers injured 
at work throughout humanitarian mine action is 
varied but always far less than an expatriate would 
expect. Generally, national deminers receive medi-
cal care and a single payment considered derisory 
in a Western environment. Despite some informal 
attempts to provide long-term support, there are 
no formal provisions for severely disabled demin-
ers to receive a disability allowance or even long-
term prosthetics and therapy assistance. Among 
the records, some evidence indicates that accident 
victims have been abandoned and have died in ex-
treme poverty or committed suicide. Those in dire 
circumstances can only be inferred because no 
comprehensive follow-up has been conducted. Im-
proved provision for demining accident victims 
should be addressed.
Summary and Recommendations
The DDAS has been of proven value to the humani-
tarian mine-action industry. It has been “a driving force” 
in promoting practical change and the sharing of experi-
ence, in creating and updating the IMAS and in the field. 
An anonymous database, it protects the privacy of those 
involved in accidents while allowing others to learn from 
their experience.
As an industry, international mine action has not ma-
tured to the point where it is open and transparent about 
its accidents. Some individuals and groups at all levels 
withhold or conceal information that could prevent fu-
ture accidents. When organizations do not disclose ac-
cident data, the managers run the risk of appearing 
criminally negligent by ignoring their responsibility for 
the safety and occupational health of their staff.
Deminers are the agents of those who fund human-
itarian mine action. They work to priorities that the 
donors have imposed, yet their treatment after an ac-
cident usually lacks any sign of the humanitarian con-
cern that lay behind their employment. It is remarkable 
that a “humanitarian” industry has made no real effort 
to make long-term provision for them—despite interest 
shown in international forums by expatriate field prac-
titioners who are concerned for their colleagues regard-
less of their nationality.
It is time for a U.N. agency to take the DDAS under 
its management, enforce the IMAS requirement for the 
sharing of accident records, and maintain the princi-
ples of anonymity and of keeping original accident re-
ports on which the DDAS was founded. This would be a 
requirement in any responsibly controlled industry and 
is a glaring omission in humanitarian mine action. A 
U.N. agency should accept responsibility for gathering 
accident records, creating an archive and conducting in-
formed analysis of that archive.
Earlier this year UNMAS asked the Geneva Inter-
national Centre for Humanitarian Demining to gather 
accident data in a new system extending the “tick-box” 
accident records recorded in the Information Manage-
ment System for Mine Action. Unfortunately, this would 
effectively mean creating a new database (instead of up-
dating the existing DDAS), and would require ignoring 
Figure 3. A two-handled excavator designed at MIT to re-
place the pick-axe. The author believes that if the Afghans 
alone were to adopt this tool, it would save at least a dozen 
hands a year.
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